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The Public-Private Split in Health Care Systems: (i) how can it be 
characterised and (ii) does it matter? 
 
Les Mayhew, Cass Business School, City University, London 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is arguable how much blame for the catastrophic decline in health in the Russian 
Federation can be attributed on failures within the health care system, or the failure of 
the public health community and government to respond adequately. The answer is 
probably academic in any case, because of the size of the economic shock following 
the fall of communism, and inherent features in the Russian culture and lifestyles that, 
left unchecked and unregulated, produce high volumes of chronic lifestyle-related 
disease and low life expectancy. The problem has got worse simply because, 
following the transition, the system became overwhelmed, due to simultaneous 
increases in demand and a collapse in finances, leading to shortages of almost 
everything (Sheimann, 1991; Adeyi et al, 1997). 
 
Since the fall of communism, Russia has turned away from the centrally planned and 
operated heath care model and edged its way towards a more market based system 
based on social insurance principles (Chernichovsky etal, 1996; Barr and Field, 1996). 
However, inequalities in access to health care continue to be rife at all levels, and in 
most areas of the country. A frequently remarked deficiency is the lack of clarity 
about what is meant by ‘public health’. Public health plays a fundamental role in 
terms of promoting health, preventing disease and eradicating inequalities, but also in 
setting the context in which the health care system is planned and co-ordinated. As 
one Russian Ministry official recently said: “Russia has a Ministry of health care, not 
a Ministry of Health”1. 
 
An effective public health system requires political close co-operation at all levels of 
government, including cross-ministerial working and co-ordination. Finland, which 
has certain similarities with Russia, has shown that it is possible to tackle some of 
these issues given the political will and determination. However, resolution of this 
question is not the principal subject of this paper, because it is health care and not 
public health that has been the most recent focus of health reforms. This in itself may 
be regarded as a signal of political priorities. 
  
Turning our attention to health care, it is generally accepted that the primary aim of 
government is to create the financial and physical capacity to deliver free or 
affordable health care services, depending on need and other factors. In coming years, 
Russia will need to restructure and re-invest in its entire health care infrastructure. 
The problem is how to navigate a pathway from where it is now to where it needs to 
be in the future, efficiently and effectively. The difficulty is that there is no ‘off-the-
shelf’ model that can be borrowed from outside and simply translated into Russia.  
                                                          
1
 This paper was prepared for the workshop  “Policy pathways to health in the Russian Federation,” 
held at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) outside Vienna on September 
19-21, 2003. The quotation arose from a preparatory visit to Russia at a meeting with academics and 
officials during 2003. 
Even if there were there would immense difficulties in dismantling the existing 
system and creating a new one. 
  
This paper considers the key lessons from modern health care systems with examples 
drawn from comparable countries and economies. It draws heavily on research 
undertaken by IIASA’s Social Security Reform (SSR) Project in countries such as the 
US, China, Japan and the UK – each of which provide distinctive organisational 
models of health care. It considers the relevance of elements in each system to the 
Russian case through the incentives that are created, relating to infrastructure 
questions and administrative processes. 
 
The analysis is partial, concentrating on key features rather than the subtle differences 
between individual systems, which are many and detailed. In the second part of the 
paper we provide a brief analysis of the extent to which each type of system provides 
‘value for money’ based on a simple economic model relating financial inputs to 
health outputs. This in itself is a value-loaded question since it depends on which 
particular feature of a health care system one wishes to emphasise. Since the key 
concern of the Russian Federation is the collapse in healthy life expectancy (HLE), it 
seems natural to use that as our outcome measure.  
 
The paper begins with a simple classification of health care systems in their pure 
form, whilst recognising that most country systems are hybrids of several types to a 
greater of lesser degree. It compares how features compare with one another and the 
logic of why some elements go together, and certain strengths and weaknesses that are 
mediated through the underlying philosophy of the system in each case. The second 
part of the paper turns to a comparison of outputs based on the model, in which HLE 
is compared with the level and composition of health care finance – whether public or 
private. 
 
Categorising health care systems 
 
All health systems share certain features.  One is that physicians are generally 
powerful players in influencing and shaping health care services. Another common 
feature, regardless of system, is the dependence of all health care systems on the 
global market for pharmaceuticals and much medical equipment. The hugely 
expensive research commitment and time spans needed to bring new pharmaceutical 
products to market inevitably mean that the industry is concentrated among a small 
number of large international corporations. This requires that all health care systems, 
whether in Russia, the UK or China, require some means of controlling their drug 
expenditures, and the costs born by the individual and the system.    
 
Another shared feature is that all health care systems increasingly struggle with the 
issue of looking after the elderly – who are the major consumers of health care today, 
especially in more developed countries. It is of some interest that nearly all health 
care systems seem to be drawing back from providing open-ended free personal and 
nursing care. Rather they are seeking in different ways to strike a balance of 
responsibilities and, therefore cost, between the individual, and the state.  
 
The solutions range from making individuals entirely responsible for their own long-
term care, with support provided only to those with limited resources, to the 
introduction of another tier of insurance as in Japan and Germany. However, for 
Russia the long-term care market is self-limiting to a degree because of the much 
lower life expectancy although it is something that can be expected to develop with 
time.  
 
Putting these common features to one side, one way to refine this classification of 
health care systems is on the basis of whether they are publicly or privately financed 
and publicly or privately operated. The four-way classification that this produces 
provides a convenient and insightful way of distinguishing between the systems and 
how they operate. It is also a way to concentrate debates about which type of system 
is in some sense ‘best’.  
 
Within each type there are several key features, which characterise each system. 
These are based on the levels of market exposure, the strategic management of 
priorities and level of responsibility ranging from the individual to the state, financial 
freedoms with regard to investment, and finally the degree of accountability and 
autonomy (WHO, 2000). These issues run through all the models discussed either 
explicitly or implicitly.  
 
Table 1 provides a more detailed exemplification of the four-way classification we 
wish to develop along with the key distinguishing features. The principal sources of 
finance, either public or private, are shown in the rows of the matrix, and the 
responsibility for service delivery, either public or private, is shown in the columns. 
Each variant is now considered in turn starting with the ‘public-public’ model.   
 
Public-public: An example of this type of system is the classic hierarchical centrally 
planned tax funded systems that typify former communist countries like Russia, and 
‘National Health Systems’ in countries such as the UK. It its pure form, this model 
has several well-known strengths but also a number of key weaknesses. The strengths 
are that access is related to health needs and not on the ability to pay so that 
inequalities based on age, gender or income are not a material factor in who gets 
treatment. Such systems have relatively small administrative costs, provide good 
value up to a point, and can be planned and regulated on rational lines. 
 
The weaknesses of such systems is the implicit rationing, based on waiting lists and 
queues, and the sometimes poor quality of services because of historically low levels 
of investment and poor maintenance. Patients may be denied direct access to 
specialists of their choice, and have to pay privately to circumvent these restrictions. 
However, there are several variants to this basic model, which are being implemented 
in countries such as the UK that could give such systems a new lease of life. 
  
Typically such variants are based on the principle of separating service providers from 
service commissioners (public ‘purchasers’) in which the commissioners contract 
with providers to provide services in defined volumes, at agreed levels of quality and 
service. Services may be restricted to a degree to only those that are approved or 
where there is a clear justification for their supply – although some would argue that 
this is an advantage.  The commissioners are therefore effectively public agents 
representing the ‘an internal market’, in which prices are mutually agreed between 
commissioner and provider.  
 
A drawback with this approach is that competition between providers is still restricted 
through lack of patient choice. In the event of a financial crisis the public purse is still 
liable to take ultimate responsibility so it is a functioning market only up to a point.  
New variants are now being developed which will give providers more flexibility and 
local accountability to be allowed to compete on a level playing field with private 
sector competitors. For Russia, the relinquishing of the wholly centralised system 
probably precludes a return to a more sophisticated version of the public-public 
model, although a return cannot be ruled out if the experiment with the social 
insurance model fails. 
 
Public-private: Typifying this kind of model are the social insurance based systems of 
Germany, Japan and certain other countries and is a model that Russia is currently 
implementing. In this example, the health care system is mostly owned and regulated 
within the public sector, although medical personnel are not necessarily public sector 
employees and have more freedoms to supplement their income through private 
practice than under the previous model. Social insurance is generally mandatory and 
publicly regulated, although the collection systems can be privately administered 
through privately owned insurance companies, which offer private insurance ‘top-
ups’. A feature of this system is the co-payments that are levied on medical 
interventions and which are billed to the patient. 
 
The strengths of this system are the clearer relationships between provision and cost, 
so that patients are encouraged to moderate their demands and ‘shop around’. A 
further advantage is that it has the capacity to diversify its sources of funding and 
therefore income through the provision of private insurance.  Patients tend to have 
more choice in terms of physician and place of treatment, which arguably leads to an 
internal market of sorts and possibly a diminution of physician and bureaucratic 
‘power’. Finally the public provider can intervene and plan so retaining a degree of 
control over future plans and investment.  
 
The main weakness of this model is the restricted coverage of the system. Social 
insurance is usually levied on employees and their families, which means that special 
arrangements are needed for people who are outside the system because they are 
unemployed or otherwise incapacitated. The administrative costs are also higher 
because collection and accounting systems need to be more sophisticated and 
responsive.  
 
In 1993, Russia passed the health insurance law, which opened the way for the 
establishment of an insurance-based health care system to relieve the chronic shortage 
of funding by injecting new sources of finance. This has proved to be a massive task 
because of the difficulty of setting up complex and robust administrative systems for 
financial management and other purposes, often working against entrenched interests 
(Titchenko, 1995; Twigg, 1999) . The resources available to the system are less than 
ideal and further reforms will undoubtedly be necessary. It is not possible to pass 
judgement on Russia’s decision to follow this path since it is probable that the 
alternatives would not have fared any better in the wake of the power struggles and 
chaos of the early years of post Soviet rule. 
 Table 1: Four-way classification of health care systems and typical characteristics 
 
Service provider  
Public Private 
pu
bl
ic
 
 
Hierarchical organisation: 
 
- government regulated 
- financed through tax 
revenues 
- bureaucratic hierarchy 
- assets publicly owned  
- state employed physicians 
- free at point of use 
- subsidised prescription 
payments 
- no safety net required 
 
 
 
Hybrid public hierarchy /private 
sector: 
 
- government regulated 
- mandatory employer based 
social insurance 
- publicly regulated collection 
systems 
- main assets publicly owned 
- significant private sector 
- physicians privately employed 
or independent contractors 
- co-payments for treatment and 
medication 
- mandatory long term care 
insurance 
- public safety net 
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Hierarchical organisation: 
 
- government regulated 
- financed through private 
insurance and fees for 
service 
- publicly owned assets 
- separate payment  for 
medication 
- optional publicly provided 
long term care arrangements 
- public safety net 
 
 
 
 
Privately owned and operated: 
 
- government regulated 
- corporate planning systems 
- financed through private 
insurance and fees for service 
- assets privately owned 
- physicians privately employed 
or independent contractors 
- separate payment for 
medication 
- no safety net 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Private/private: The most well known exponent of this system is the US. In this 
system providers can be either in the private or public sector. Medical facilities can be 
part of a larger corporation or publicly owned by the municipality or a charitable trust. 
In either case patients must pay for care unless their income drops below a specified 
level in which case they receive public support. The key difference with the social 
insurance model is that medical insurance is not a mandatory part of employment, 
whilst the benefits of medical insurance are more heavily circumscribed in terms of 
procedures and time-limited in terms of benefits. The US system is certainly 
expensive, accounting for over twice the proportion of GDP compared with the 
international average. Paradoxically, it is also the model adopted by developing 
countries, where public finance is limited and overall funding is well below  where it 
should be (Cichon and Gillion, 1993). 
 
The strengths of the US system are that it generates a lot of resources that can be 
deployed in medical research which results in the US being pre-eminent in many 
fields of medical research and the quality of care for those who can afford it can be 
very high. There are, on the other hand, considerable weaknesses. Because health 
insurance is not mandatory the system is vulnerable to adverse selection tendencies, 
which raise the cost of insurance. There are significant inequalities in coverage 
between those who receive employer benefits or pay directly and those who can’t 
afford to pay or for whom the insurance has run out. The administrative systems to 
support private health care are considerable and substantially add to costs, whilst the 
insurance system encourages patients to over consume and physicians to over-
provide.  
 
The US recognises these problems and has evolved various means of overcoming 
them without actually dismantling the fundamentally private nature of the system. For 
low-earners, there is the  “Medicaid” system, and for older people there is 
“Medicare,” which provides certain free health care benefits to older people. To keep 
costs down, the US has also pioneered the concept of Health Maintenance 
Organisations in which provision and insurance are combined to lesson incentives to 
over-consume or over-provide. For some years, it has also used a system of standard 
costs for different interventions to reduce the temptation to charge exorbitant rates for 
specific interventions.  
 
Private-public This method organisation is probably the most unusual of the four 
types and there are relatively few examples on which to base judgements or compare 
experiences. The best example is China, which has pursued a development path in 
which limited private sector reforms have been encouraged within an overall 
framework of state control. The origins of these reforms lie in the dismantling of the 
old state enterprises and with them employer-based health care and pension systems. 
Unlike Russia, the transition in China has been more controlled and thorough, with 
alternative arrangements being introduced selectively and at a measured pace.  
 
In addition, China persists with the distinction between the rural and urban health 
systems, which are significantly different.  In allowing the rural public health system 
to disintegrate, the Chinese government has effectively reneged on its commitment to 
provide state medical care to rural Chinese.  In Russia, while there is certainly less 
than meets the eye to the state guarantee of universal access to free medical care, no 
such drastic backtracking on policy commitments has taken place. 
  
As far as Chinese urban health care reforms are concerned, the hospitals and assets 
are still controlled by the state whilst physicians and other medical personnel remain 
public employees. The patient, by contrast, has essentially two options: enrol in one of 
public or private health insurance systems that are springing up or pay out of pocket. 
The collection systems are still relatively crude, with insurance contributions made 
through personal visits to local offices, whilst public hospitals handle quite substantial 
amounts of cash that are handed over by the patient after a visit is completed.  
 
These are transitional issues and the main limitation of the current system is that the 
insurance benefits are capped in any one year, and individuals exceeding their limits 
must pay the additional costs. Because the urban population is relatively young and 
healthy, the cash inflows from insurance contributions exceed pay-outs and so the 
system remains solvent at the moment. This will not always be the case however. 
 
Health care financing and outputs 
 
Modern medical practice is reasonably standardised and one would expect treatments 
provided publicly or privately to have about the same health impact.  The means of 
finance, however, may be expected to significantly affect what treatments are 
provided and who receives them.  In this section, we ask whether health outcomes 
vary systematically, not only with the overall level of funding, but with the public-
private mix of health care expenditure.   
 
One way to analyse the performance of different health care systems is to compare the 
average healthy life expectancy in each country with per capita expenditure. Healthy 
life expectancy may be defined as the average years of life lived in a healthy state. It 
is less than average life expectancy at birth, usually by a factor of 9-10 years 
depending on the country and its level of development (Mayhew, 2003). If we were to 
plot a graph based on HLE against the per capita level of health expenditure, we 
would obtain the curve shown in Figure 1, which is based on data published by the 
World Health Organisation for the year 2000 for 191 countries. It shows that HLE 
grows rapidly up to income levels of say $1000 per head, after which HLE gains taper 
off.  
 
Highlighted in the graph are the actual positions of the five countries, which have 
been discussed in the previous sections, each which different health care systems. 
They are, from left to right on the graph, China, Russia, UK, Japan, and US.  
Countries that are above the line are attaining a higher level of HLE for their relative 
spending on health care than countries below the line. The differences between the 
countries are clearly expenditure-related, but are they also related to their methods of 
financing? If there is a relationship between the public-private mix what can one 
conclude about the relative merits of one system versus another?  
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Figure 1: Healthy life expectancy (HLE) as a function of health care spending per 
capita: fitted curve based 192 countries (log HLE = 3.313+0.124x, where x is 
spending per capita: R2 = 0.64). Individual countries highlighted from left to right are 
China, Russia, UK, Japan and US.  
 
We therefore re-ran the above model separating out public and private spending using 
a simple production type function in which the independent variables are private and 
public spending per capita. The equation fitted was 
 
ln (healthy life expectancy) = α +  ȕ ln (public health expenditure per capita ) +  
     + Ȗ ln (private health expenditure per capita ) 
 
This yielded coefficients for public spending of 0.0822 and 0.0376 for private 
spending (R2= 0.64,α = 3.42). Thus, as our first inference we note that improvements 
to HLE from public spending on health care on average occur at over twice the rate 
compared with private spending.  
 
In Figure 2, we present a way of interpreting residuals, i.e. the errors between 
expected HLE calculated using the fitted equation and observed HLE.  On the 
horizontal axis is public expenditure and on the vertical axis private expenditure.  A 
family of curves, of which we illustrate three, shows combinations of public and 
private expenditure, which will result in various levels of HLE.  Curves lying to the 
right and higher above the origin represent higher levels of HLE.  Note that these 
curves may be drawn on the basis of our parameter estimates by varying HLE and 
calculating the combinations of public and private spending that are consistent with it.   
 
A “budget line” such as PQ represents combinations of public and private spending 
that sum to the same total, in this case $400.  Assuming that there is only $400 to be 
spent, the highest HLE may be obtained by dividing it between public and private at 
the point of tangency A, corresponding to $275 in public spending and $125 in private 
spending (a ratio of 2.2 to 1; all points corresponding to this ratio are illustrated as a 
ray from the origin).  We refer to this split as corresponding to “optimal allocative 
efficiency” because it results in the highest possible HLE given the overall $400 
constraint.   In the example given, actual observed HLE is 57.5 years (point C) and, 
with improved allocation, this could be raised to 58 years (point A).  Actual HLE, in 
this example, is assumed to be 60 years. 
 
It turns out that the gap between expected HLE and actual HLE can be much greater 
than the gap between expected HLE and allocatively efficient HLE. We describe a 
country below its expected HLE, given its level of health spending, as having a ‘life 
style or public health deficit’. Countries that fall most frequently in this category are 
often developing countries especially those afflicted by AIDS, where the existing 
health care system have proved to be more or less powerless against this epidemic. 
Actual HLE in our example is well above the expected level. This suggests that this 
country has attained what might be described as a ‘life style or public health dividend’ 
because its HLE is above where it should be based on the average of all countries in 
the model. 
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Figure 2: Healthy life expectancy as a function of public and private expenditure for a 
hypothetical country and its relationship to healthy life expectancy. 
 
 Actual HLE 
(years) 
Expected HLE 
(years) 
HLE based on 
optimal allocative 
efficiency (years)
Actual public 
spending per 
capita ($) 
Actual private 
spending per 
capita ($) 
Ratio of 
public to 
private 
spending 
China 62.8 52.37 53.70 75.0 130.0 0.58 
Japan 73.5 70.45 70.59 1540.9 468.1 3.29 
Russia 56.6 58.24 58.27 293.6 111.4 2.64 
UK 69.2 69.18 69.55 1436.9 337.1 4.26 
US 67.4 76.64 77.75 1993.1 2505.9 0.80 
Table 2: Comparison of health life expectancy with public and private health care 
expenditure in countries with differently structures health care systems. 
 Table 2 shows results for the countries discussed in previous paragraphs, which were 
taken to be representative of the health care systems operating different financial 
arrangements. Expected HLE (Column 2) is as predicted by the equation just given.  
“HLE based on optimal allocative efficiency” (Column 3) is the highest HLE that 
could be obtained by re-allocating expenditure between public and private, keeping 
the total the same and according to the family of curves that we have estimated.  The 
following are some key points arising: 
  China spends least on health care based on these data. Actual HLE is 62.8 years 
compared with 52.37 expected HLE. At 10.43 years China has the largest healthy 
life style dividend among this group (although this author has some concerns 
about the quality of Chinese data).  A more allocatively efficient system of 
financing would only achieve 53.70 years of HLE by comparison. 
  Japan is the second biggest spender on health care in this group and has the 
highest HLE. Actual HLE is 3.05 years higher than expected HLE based on its 
level of spending, so there is also a positive HLE life style dividend in the 
Japanese case. A more allocatively efficient spending mix, however, would only 
add 0.14 years to expected HLE. 
  The level of spending in Russia is below all the other countries except China. 
Actual HLE is the lowest among this whole group of countries, and lower than the 
expected HLE by a margin of 1.64 years, suggesting a lifestyle deficit using 
previous terminology. A more allocatively efficient system of financing would 
only contribute 0.03  years to the expected HLE.   
  Actual HLE in the UK is 69.2 years compared with a similar expected value based 
on international comparisons. Its allocatively efficient level of HLE is 0.37 years 
above the expected level, so that the UK could perform slightly better with a more 
privately weighted public-private mix. 
  The US spends far more than any other country on health care, but its actual HLE 
is only 67.4 years compared with an expected HLE of 76.64 years based on its 
level of expenditure. This represents a lifestyle deficit of  9.24 years. US spending 
on health care is proportionately more skewed towards private expenditure than 
the other countries with the exception of China. If the US were allocatively more 
efficient HLE would rise by 1.11 years. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we presented a 2x2 matrix scheme for characterising health care systems 
by whether provision and financing of health care was public or private.  This scheme 
allowed us to describe approaches to health care in countries as diverse as the US, 
UK, Japan, China, and Russia. 
 
A great deal of attention has been devoted to finding the optimal public-private mix in 
health care finance.  We found that, after controlling for the level of overall funding, 
deviations from expected healthy life expectancy were due not to misallocation of 
spending, but to what we lumped together as “life style and public health” variables.  
In the Russian context, this suggests that health care reformers, while not ignoring 
questions of finance (or for that matter, provision) should urgently tackle contextual 
problems such as unhealthy life style.   
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